Weaponisation of Water in Somalia

Today I hope to build on my previous blog posts by examining the use of water as a political tool within Somalia.  Frequently viewed only as the epitome of a war-ridden country most affected by climate change, I wish to avoid sweeping stereotypes of Somali conflict (as mentioned in my first post) and will focus on water-induced political acts.

Somalia hosts two transboundary basins: the Jubba and the Shebelle, which both originate in Ethiopia and offer a fertile hiatus in an otherwise dry and arid landscape. These two rivers are vulnerable to sporadic rainfall and frequent droughts that characterise the surrounding climate. Additionally, many irrigation systems along the river are not working, meaning that water access points are scarce and most citizens depend on the 10 existing aquifers that offer access to groundwater through boreholes and shallow wells.

Figure 1: Map of Somali rivers

These limits in supply mean actors have regularly exploited the potency of these rivers and groundwater sites to further their agendas. This is most notably, but by all means not exclusively, illustrated by the Al-Quaeda-affiliated militant group Al-Shabaab. In 2014, a member of the Somali parliament stated that Al-Shabaab had started to cut off liberated cities from their water sources to erode government legitimacy. This led to over 250,000 deaths and mass migration. Again in 2018, water became weaponised when the jihadist group diverted water from the Lower Juba river to ambush and kill American and Kenyan troops.

These alarming examples reveal the political undercurrents of water resources and, more specifically, how water can be used as a coercive and tactical weapon to pursue power. These atrocities have also driven scientists to examine the pernicious impact of environmental change on the decision to adopt such strategies. In Somalia, rainfall has become increasingly erratic, alternating between continuous dry spells or devastating flash flooding, such as in November 2020 where the Cyclone Gati brought two years of rainfall in just two days. Somali droughts have become an inescapable way of life and have repeatedly dominated international headlines for the past decade. Media attention was most acute in '2016 when 6.2 million Somalis were in acute food security' and this year when '70% of families were left without access to safe drinking water'.

These new and unpredictable climate patterns have forced researchers to re-examine the interlinkages between water stress and armed conflict in Somalia, as outlined by the diagram below. Although water scarcity does not directly equate to violence it can trigger brewing tensions and alter groups' political tactics accordingly.  

Figure 2

*Please note that since the link between water scarcity and conflict is tenuous and context-specific, this diagram may not be applicable to other states.

With added water scarcity, Al-Shabaab can capitalise on resulting local grievances and draw in 'internally displaced persons separated from their traditional support' systems. State failures to resolve these issues make jihadist inscription seem a lot more appealing and allow the Al-Shabaab to propagate their network. For example, in 2017 Al-Shabaab set up alternative drought committees to coordinate drought relief. More recently, the group has acted as a quasi-government by setting levies on the use of water resources under their control. Therefore, nations need to recognise water as potential tool for terror and act accordingly.

To sum up, when volatile power dynamics and poor management capacity are met with climate-driven environmental scarcity, the weaponisation of water may prosper. Equally, when conflict is rife, groups do not have the incentive or capabilities to minimise climate crises. With COP26 currently in action, these conclusions have become ever more prevalent, and urge us not to 'forget the people in conflict' when making our pledges. This plea has been echoed by the ICRC's reminder of the Paris agreements' failures to act on this complex conflict-climate change nexus; nearly 70% of climate finance funds have been given to middle-income countries and only a mere 14% to poorer violence-prone countries. This significant disparity makes it impossible to build climate resilience in states such as Somalia.

Let's hope COP26 can do more to support those most vulnerable to climate change dangers!