Hydro-hegemony along the Nile

In a bid to further amplify African voices in relation to my research, I wish to inaugurate this week’s blog post with an appraisal of Rawia Tawfik, a professor at Cairo University, and her work on hegemonic power struggles along the Nile. She confirms that ‘tensions over the Nile are not just about water’  but reflect long-standing historic and political grievances. The GERD, therefore, should not only be seen as a ‘game changer’ for water reserves but for Egypt’s reigning hegemony over the Basin. 

As the U.N. Security Council stepped up to help re-invigorate the negotiation deadlock, between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan in September this year, Tawfik’s literature may provide valuable insights into these trilateral negotiations regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). 

Photograph 1: GERD complaint to the security council

What is a hydro-hegemon? 

The GERD has initiated an intense dialogue between these three states, which according to Tawfik is shaped by power asymmetries, a term that encompasses multiple dimensions. For example, an initial examination of hydro-power would suggest that a dominant geographic position within a transboundary basin will ensure control over the allocation of water reserves. However, this superficial logic can immediately be debunked if we observe the hydro-political configurations along the Nile. Despite Ethiopia controlling 86% of the Nile’s water flow and holding a tremendous potential for water storage, it has been Egypt that has attained unparalleled dominance over the river. Indeed, Tawfik, borrowing from other scholars, stresses that we should take into account the ‘material, bargaining, and ideational’ aspects of hydropower.

Since its independence, Egypt’s relative power has been enhanced by close connections with foreign powers and a strong strategic position in terms of trade and military might. In addition, Egypt has formulated two treaties that have allowed them to limit upstream states from capitalizing on their riparian position. These were signed between Egypt and Britain in 1929, and again 30 years later between Egypt and Sudan to re-codify Egypt’s unequivocal access to water. 

Exerting this power within the region, Egypt has engaged in extensive large-scale agricultural land acquisitions and financed various water-drilling activities in Ethiopia. This shows that Egypt has employed various hegemonic measures (as identified in my previous blogpost) within multiple sectors to establish control over the Nile. 

Photograph 2: Construction of GERD

The GERD: a counter-hegemonic measure? 

In the last two decades, Egypt’s stronghold over the Nile Basin has been put into question, with Egypt pre-occupied by the Egyptian Spring of 2011 and Ethiopia enjoying new political stability, foreign relations,  and being one of the fastest growing economies in the continent since 2003.

These developments have tipped the balance of power towards Ethiopia, giving them the economic and political might to propose the dam in 2011 and redraw the terms of accessibility to the Nile through new multilateral agreements. Two examples of legal changes being initiated are the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA) and the Agreement on Declaration of Principles on Ethiopia’s dam.

These initiatives represent a regional power shift since, despite the dam not presenting a direct risk to long-term Egyptian water supply, it had engendered an initial visceral reaction in Egypt with several efforts to postpone negotiations or even sabotage the construction of the dam. Now that the water is already being filled for the second time, and Egypt having limited options but to comply, we have seen Ethiopia both delay and pull out of several negotiation procedures. Since a unilateral agreement may curb its elevated power status, Ethiopia’s lack of compliance should be considered as a hegemonic tactic to regain sovereignty. In this vein, it would be unlikely to see Ethiopia making meaningful concessions until new treaties are made that institutionalise Ethiopia’s rights over the Nile. 

The idea that these GERD negotiations go 'beyond water resources' is further highlighted by the deteriorating relations between Sudan and Egypt. Despite these downstream allies having enjoyed long-standing water cooperation, Sudan has increasingly backed Ethiopian interests. The GERD comes as new impetus for Sudan to challenge Egypt's 'paternalistic attitude' towards Sudanese activities, which has recently manifested in renewed disputes over the control of the 'Halayeb Triangle' border territory and a reduction in bilateral agricultural trade agreements. 

The GERD, therefore, highlights the pivotal role of power dynamics in transboundary management agreements and shows how they do not reflect a uniform cooperative or competitive relationship.